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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the presence of workplace union representatives in the British public 
sector, and also the extent to which union representatives are engaged in partnership working 
with management, drawing on data from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2011. 
This analysis is timely given government plans to introduce reporting requirements and 
reserve powers to restrict public sector facility time in the Trade Union Bill 2015-16. The 
analysis finds that in workplaces with union recognition, union representatives are more 
prevalent and there are more representatives per employee in the public than the private 
sector, but there is no evidence that this should be viewed as excessive or that managers view 
it as problematic. There is, on balance, greater evidence of partnership working between 
union representatives and managers in the public than the private sector. Given the 
importance of partnership working in improving public services, the results suggest the 
provisions in the Trade Union Bill 2015-16 relating to public sector facility time are more 
likely to hinder rather than support public sector managers in their attempts to improve public 
service provision in the future.   
 
Introduction 
 
The role of workplace union representatives (shop stewards and staff representatives) has 
been considered an important aspect of industrial relations in Britain since the 1950s (Terry 
1995). Indeed the Donovan Commission’s report to the British government towards the end 
of the 1960s regarded the lack of official recognition for union representatives in the 
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workplace as a major cause of industrial unrest that hindered attempts to introduce changes 
and improve productivity (Royal Commission on Unions and Employers’ Associations 
1968). In order to reduce industrial relations conflict and improve productivity, subsequent 
attempts were made to formalise representatives’ role and duties and to integrate them into 
consultation and negotiation processes. This was considered necessary not least as the 
number of workplace union representatives quadrupled from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, 
reflecting increased collective bargaining at the workplace-level (Charlwood and Forth 2009, 
p. 76).  
Statutory backing was later provided in the 1970s for workplace union representatives 
in recognition of their increased role. This backing, later consolidated into the Trade Union 
and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, required employers in workplaces where 
unions were recognised for collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment to 
provide reasonable facility time and facilities for union representatives to enable them to: 
carry out duties concerned with negotiations; represent employees; engage in consultation 
and negotiations specifically on redundancies and the transfer of undertakings; and to 
undertake training for these duties. In addition, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 
provided statutory backing for union safety representatives. These combined provisions 
recognised the role of workplace union representatives in promoting good employment 
practice, helping to manage change and developing a positive workplace climate (ACAS 
2010).  
The legislative support provided for union representatives therefore represents an 
acknowledgement of the benefits of collective representation for both employees and 
employers. Where employees are concerned, workplace union representatives provide a 
collective voice channel by which the workforce can express concerns relating to their 
working conditions, pay, training requirements and health and safety, for example (Freeman 
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and Medoff 1984). Employers may be more inclined to respond to such concerns if they are 
raised by workplace union representatives: than by individual employees, as this will indicate 
that these concerns are widely-held among the workforce and that the union considers them 
to be legitimate; or by employer-union negotiations at a higher organisational level, as 
managers might not view these concerns as directly relevant to their specific workplace. In 
addition, workplace union representatives might also benefit employees via ‘facilitation 
effects’, whereby they provide information, advice and guidance to employees, and support 
them when raising issues and seeking to resolve complaints (Budd and Mumford 2004). As 
workplace union representatives will have considerable knowledge of the individual 
employees’ workplace, they are likely to be better placed to provide appropriate help and 
advice than union representatives based above the workplace level.  
However, union representative activity is also potentially of benefit to employers. The 
government-commissioned Macleod Report (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
2009) endorsed by Prime Minister David Cameron (Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills 2011), for example, suggests that managers should listen to the concerns expressed by 
employees and their representatives, and that addressing these concerns will increase levels 
of employee engagement, thereby helping to deliver sustainable economic growth. Similarly, 
ACAS (2003) argue that by helping to ensure employees’ concerns regarding their working 
conditions are listened to and addressed, union representatives play an important role in 
improving workforce engagement and morale. This in turn has the potential to improve 
labour productivity, the quality of services provided, and ultimately the financial performance 
of organisations. In addition, union representatives may play an important dispute resolution 
role, helping employers resolve conflict by accompanying employees to disciplinary 
proceedings (thus ensuring those proceedings adhere to the ACAS Code of Practice (ACAS 
2015)). They might also provide advice to managers to prevent the escalation of disputes to 
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industrial tribunal cases, thereby helping to avoid the costs associated with such cases 
(ACAS, 2003). Beyond this, by improving consultation and information exchange, they 
might help managers to reduce sickness absence and upgrade employment practices in the 
workplace and possibly the broader organisation.  
In light of the above debates, the aim of this paper is to draw on the 2011 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey to provide further empirical analysis of union representatives’ 
presence in British workplaces, and the extent to which they are engaged in partnership 
working with managers, thereby indicating the extent to which they might be viewed as 
adding value to their workplaces. It focuses in particular on the public sector. This focus is 
particularly important given the recently-elected Conservative government’s ongoing 
concerns over the value of union facility time in the public sector, and its plans to introduce 
reporting requirements and reserve powers to restrict public sector facility time in the Trade 
Union Bill 2015-16. The government’s concerns (outlined in more detail below) are that there 
too many union representatives in the public sector (and in particular that too many union 
representatives are operating on a full-time basis), and that the activities in which they engage 
may be deleterious to their organisations. This paper seeks to identify, therefore, whether 
union representatives can indeed be considered to be too numerous in the public sector, and 
also whether they are failing to engage in the sort of joint working with management that is 
likely to engender workplace performance benefits.  
 
The regulation of facility time and the need for contemporary empirical analysis 
Despite acknowledging the positive impact that workplace union representatives may have, 
governments of all persuasions have conducted occasional reviews to assess their economic 
value and to reconsider the case for statutory facilities and facility time. A review under the 
former Labour government using the nationally-representative Workplace Employment 
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Relations Survey 2004 conducted by the Department of Trade and Industry identified a range 
of positive effects associated with workplace union representative presence (DTI, 2007). It 
revealed, for example, that workplaces with union representatives had lower voluntary exit 
rates (saving the British economy recruitment costs estimated at £72m-143m per annum) and 
fewer industrial tribunal cases (saving the British economy an estimated £22m-£43m per 
annum).  
However, the economic downturn following the financial crash of 2008 led to a 
further reassessment by the coalition government of the value of workplace union 
representatives and the facility time provided by employers. This reassessment focussed on 
the role of workplace union representatives in the public sector for two reasons. First, union 
membership and union recognition is now heavily concentrated in the public sector. Second, 
public sector expenditure has been squeezed by plans to reduce the government’s spending 
and borrowing requirements, leading to the search for short-term cost savings. 
 This reassessment of the value provided by workplace union representatives and 
facility time initially concentrated on the civil service, and resulted in Francis Maude as Head 
of the Cabinet Office restricting facility time for civil service union representatives. This 
subsequently resulted in a reported reduction in the number of full-time union representatives 
in government departments from 200 in November 2011 to 20 at the start of 2014 (Cabinet 
Office 2014). The Department for Education also held a consultation over facility time in 
schools, subsequently issuing non-statutory advice (Department for Education 2013, 2014) 
suggesting ‘All union representatives who receive facility time to represent members 
employed in schools should spend the majority of their working hours carrying out their main 
duties as school employees’. The Department for Communities and Local Government (2013, 
p. 5) also issued similar non-statutory advice stating: ‘Employees should not be spending all 
or the majority of their working hours on trade union duties. The Government believes that 
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for a trade union representative to function effectively and be able adequately to represent the 
views of employees, it is necessary for them to be actively involved in the work of their 
employing organisation’. It also encouraged local councils to reduce facility time for union 
representatives stating ‘Councils should adopt private sector levels of facility time’ (ibid., p. 
3).  
The new Conservative government has gone a step further, however, with the Trade 
Union Bill 2015-16, introduced on first reading to the House of Commons on 15 July 2015, 
making explicit reference to facility time for union representatives. Provisions in the Bill, 
which represents the first significant change in collective labour law in Britain since the 
Trade Union Act 1984, include the requirement for public sector employers to publish details 
of the paid time off received by trade union representatives to perform their representative 
duties (sometimes termed ‘trade union activities’) and reserve powers for government 
Ministers to limit paid time for union representatives (facility time) as a proportion of the 
representatives’ working time. These provisions reflect the view that there may be too many 
union workplace representatives in the public sector and, in particular, that there may be too 
many union representatives that spend all (or almost all) of their time on representative duties 
rather than in their job roles (Department for Communities and Local Government 2013; 
Department for Education 2013, 2014). There is also a concern that full-time representatives 
in particular do not ‘reflect and respond to the wishes and views of the grassroots members’ 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2013, p. 3).  In addition, concern has 
also been expressed that workplace union representatives are using facility time to engage in 
political activity, such as ‘trade union activities and campaigning’, producing ‘political 
material, or material which incites industrial action’ (ibid.). Government ministers have 
subsequently argued that, if true, this represents an inappropriate use of public money 
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(Department for Communities and Local Government 2013). It is, however, unclear whether 
such concerns are well founded.  
Either way, the reporting requirements and reserve powers in relation to facility time 
in the public sector contained in the Trade Union Bill 2015-16 appear likely to increase 
managerial scrutiny of workplace union representatives and result in less support for 
representative activities. Restricting facility time will, however, only help improve public 
services and public sector finances if the types of concerns described above regarding the 
impact of workplace union representative presence are valid, and if the benefits of facility 
time (as previously identified by government (DTI 2007) in terms of higher retention rates 
and fewer tribunal cases, for example) are outweighed by their costs associated with the time 
off union representatives take from their regular jobs.  
This paper draws on data from the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study 
(WERS 2001) to seek to contribute towards this debate by addressing the following research 
aims. The first is to provide an empirical assessment of the presence of workplace union 
representatives in the public sector. This will involve an estimate of the proportion of public 
sector workplaces that have union representatives and the ratio of representatives to 
employees, thus allowing an assessment of whether there are too many (or too few) 
representatives in place. The analysis will also estimate the proportion of workplaces in the 
public sector that have a union representative spending all (or almost all) of their time on 
their representative duties1. The paper will also consider the average number of hours per 
week spent by the lead workplace union representative on their representative duties and 
whether the lead representative is paid by the employer for the time they spend on these 
duties.  
 The second aim of the paper is to provide an empirical assessment of the extent to 
which union representatives are engaged in consultation/partnership working with managers, 
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thereby indicating the extent to which they might be viewed as adding value to their 
workplaces. With regard to this, the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 
2004 require employers to put arrangements in place to inform and consult employees (where 
employees make such a request) on the business’s economic situation, employment prospects 
and decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or contractual 
relations. Increased levels of consultation were also viewed as central to management-union 
partnership working encouraged by government to help reform and improve public services 
(DTI 1998; Work Foundation 2004), resulting in partnership agreements covering one-third 
of all public sector employees by 2007 (Bacon and Samuel 2009). The analysis therefore 
explores the involvement of workplace union representatives on joint consultative 
committees, as recommended by ACAS (2014). 
Beyond this, as argued by Dietz (2004), a key indicator of the existence of partnership 
working is whether there are high trust relationships between union representatives and 
managers. As such, the paper assesses this issue by evaluating the extent to which managers 
and union representatives trust each other to act with honesty and integrity. This might be 
regarded as providing insight into the government’s suggestion that workplace union 
representatives may misuse taxpayer-funded facilities and facility time to produce ‘political 
material, or material which incites industrial action’ (Department for Communities and Local 
Government 2013, p. 3) – if union representatives are engaging in such activities on a broad 
scale, it is unlikely that managers will report that they act with honesty and integrity. Further 
exploration of the existence of partnership working between managers and union 
representatives is undertaken by identifying the extent to which union representatives are 
involved in joint decision-making when changes are being introduced at the workplace, and 
the extent to which managers offer support to representatives by providing them with 
facilities to use as part of their representative duties at the workplace. 
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Given that a key government concern is that provision for facility time in the public 
sector exceeds provision in the private sector (Department for Communities and Local 
Government (2013, p.3), the analysis systematically compares union representative presence 
and involvement in partnership working in the public and private sectors. In addition, given 
the government’s specific concerns outlined above that full-time union representatives may 
be too numerous and particularly problematic, the analysis presents results for the union 
representative population as a whole and also for full-time representatives more specifically 
 
Data and method 
 
The analysis draws on data from two elements of the 2011 Workplace Employee Relations 
Study (WERS) (BIS 2013): the survey of managers and the survey of worker representatives. 
The Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2011 is co-sponsored by the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), ACAS, the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC), the UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) and the National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research (NIESR). Using these data also provides an element of 
continuity with previous government analyses of union facility time that used data from the 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 (DTI, 2007).  
Where the survey of managers is concerned, this is designed to be nationally 
representative of British workplaces with five or more employees in all industry sectors (with 
the exception of agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing and mining and quarrying) when 
probability weighted to account for the complex nature of the WERS survey design. 
Respondents to the survey are the most senior manager in the workplace with responsibility 
for employment relations, human resources or personnel. The complete WERS 2011 survey 
of managers includes 2680 workplaces, constituting a response rate of 46.3 per cent. Of these, 
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822 are in the public sector and 1858 are in the private sector. Workplaces with a union 
representative are defined as those in which a representative is present and their union is 
recognised for collective bargaining purposes2. This results in 561 public sector workplaces 
and 389 private sector workplaces being classified as having a union representative.  
Where the survey of worker representatives is concerned, managers in workplaces 
with union representatives were asked for consent to interview one trade union employee 
representative and one non-trade union representative. The interview was conducted with the 
most senior lay representative of the largest recognised union at the workplace, or the largest 
non-recognised union if none were recognised. Among the 1153 workplaces that had an 
eligible union representative, 797 workplaces generated a productive interview, giving a 
response rate of 69 per cent. The analysis is based on responses from 760 union 
representatives in workplaces with union recognition (472 in the public sector and 288 in 
private sector)3. 
The results presented below are weighted throughout. This is essential if accurate 
population estimates are to be obtained, given the complex stratified nature of the WERS 
survey design, and in particular, the over-sampling of large workplaces. 
 
Results 
 
The presence of workplace union representatives in the public sector 
The first aim of the paper is to consider the presence of workplace union representation in 
public sector workplaces. As outlined above, given the government’s specific concerns 
regarding the number of representatives spending all (or nearly all) of their time on their 
representative duties, this requires an assessment of both the population of union 
representatives generally and of full-time representatives more specifically. 
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Turning first to the proportion of public sector workplaces that have a union 
representative, the first row of table 1 demonstrates that 35 per cent of public sector 
workplaces but only 4 per cent of private sector workplaces have a union representative 
present. This difference is to be expected, however, given that private sector workplaces are 
less likely than public sector workplaces to have a union. Restricting the analysis to 
workplaces with union recognition, however, public sector workplaces are still more likely to 
have a union representative (38 per cent) than are private sector workplaces (26 per cent) (p = 
0.023). However, to place these figures in historical context, the proportions of public sector 
workplaces where unions are recognised with union representatives present were 82 per cent 
in 1980, 85 per cent in 1984, 73 per cent in 1990, 71 per cent in 1998 and 63 per cent in 2004 
(Charlwood and Forth 2009, p. 77). The figures for 2011 therefore indicate a significant and 
continued decline in the proportion of public sector workplaces with union representatives 
present. 
 
Table 1: Workplace union representatives in the public and private sector  
 Public sector  Private sector  p value 
Proportion of all workplaces that have a union 
representative 
35% 4% 0.000 
Proportion of workplaces with union recognition 
that have a union representative 
38% 26% 0.023 
Proportion of employees in workplaces with a 
union representative present 
71% 23% 0.000 
Ratio of employees to representatives in 
workplaces where representatives are present 
1:42 1:66 0.000 
Proportion of workplaces with recognition and a 
full-time union rep 
2.8% 2.2% 0.498 
Average size of workplaces with a full-time union 
representative  
509 employees 583 employees  
Average size of workplaces with a non-full-time 
union representative 
97 employees 167 employees  
Average hours per week spent by the lead 
representative on their representative duties1 
14.5 10.4 0.104 
Proportion of workplaces in which the lead 
representative is paid by the employer for the time 
spent on their representative duties1 
84% 95% 0.009 
Base: all workplaces 
1
 based on data from survey of worker representatives 
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Although these figures might suggest that most public sector employees do not now 
have access to a union representative in their workplace, it must be kept in mind that union 
representatives in the public sector tend to be found in particularly large workplaces (as 
demonstrated in the second row of table 1). Hence, 71 per cent of the public sector workforce 
are employed in workplaces that have a representative. The comparable figure for the 
proportion of employees in workplaces where representatives are present in the private sector 
as a whole is 23 per cent. In historical context, however, public sector workers’ access to a 
workplace union representative has continued to decline. The percentages of union members 
employed in public sector workplaces with union recognition and a workplace union 
representative were 92 per cent in 1980 to 81 per cent in 2004 (Charlwood and Forth 2009, p. 
78). Either way, there is little support for the argument that the number of representatives in 
the sector is excessive, given that 62 per cent of public sector workplaces do not have a 
representative at all. 
In terms of the ratio of employees to representatives in workplaces where 
representatives are present, the third row of table 1 shows a ratio of 1 representative to 42 
employees in the public sector compared to 1 representative to 66 employees in the private 
sector (p = 0.000). It is, of course, a value judgement as to whether the ratio in the public 
sector should be considered too high relative to the ratio in the private sector. This is 
considered further below in the section on managers’ views of union representatives. If the 
ratio is indeed too high in the public sector it might be anticipated that public sector managers 
will hold more negative views of union representatives than will their counterparts in the 
private sector. 
The figures in the fourth row of table 1 consider the proportion of workplaces in the 
public sector with a full-time representative. In workplaces with union recognition, only 2.8 
per cent of public sector workplaces with recognised trade unions have a union representative 
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that spends all or nearly all of their working time on their representative duties. This is not 
statistically different than the figure of 2.2 per cent in the private sector (p = 0.498). In 
interpreting these figures, one must keep in mind that while a given workplace might have 
one representative that spends most of all of their time on their representative duties, there 
may be many other representatives in the workplaces who spend significantly less time on 
their representative duties. As such, the figures should not be interpreted as suggesting that 
2.8 per cent of representatives in the public sector spend most or all of their time on their 
representative duties – the actual figure is likely to be much lower than this. Therefore, also 
keeping in mind that these figures are reported by managers themselves and are not subject to 
underreporting by union representatives, it appears that government concerns about the 
number of union representatives in the public sector (and in particular the number of 
representatives that are operating on a full-time basis) may be overstated. 
In further considering whether the number of full-time workplace union 
representatives in the public sector may be regarded as appropriate, it is helpful to consider 
the size of the workplaces in which full-time union representatives in the public sector tend to 
be found. This is explored in rows 5 and 6 of table 1. This shows that public sector 
workplaces with full-time union representatives are much larger on average (509 employees) 
in contrast with those with non-full-time union representatives (97 employees). A similar 
pattern is reported in the private sector, where workplaces with full-time union 
representatives have 583 employees on average, and workplaces with non-full-time 
representatives have 167 employees on average. As such, the findings suggest that where 
representatives work on a full-time basis (in both public and private sector workplaces), they 
do so because they represent a large number of employees, hence they will have a wide range 
of employment relations issues to contend with. This further suggests that the existence of 
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full-time union representation should not be viewed as inappropriate given the types of 
workplaces in which they are found. 
Rows seven and eight of table 1 considers the average amount of time union 
representatives spend on their representative duties and whether the employer funds this time. 
The data for this assessment are taken from the WERS worker representative survey, which  
provides information on how many hours on average the lead representative usually spends 
each week just on representative activities, whether paid or unpaid (including both time spent 
at the workplace and at home). Row seven in table 1 shows that lead representatives in the 
public sector spend 14.5 hours per week on average on their representative activities 
compared with 10.4 hours per week for lead representatives in the private sector. This 
difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.104). Also, as this is a survey of lead 
representatives in the workplace, the figures should not be interpreted as suggesting that 
representatives in the public sector spend 14.5 hours per week on average on their 
representative activities. Non-lead representatives are likely to spend much less time on 
representative activities than this. The figures also do not imply that more representatives in 
the public sector have facility time than representatives in the private sector. Indeed, the final 
row in table 1 shows that fewer lead representatives in the public sector (84 per cent) report 
that they are paid by the employer for the time spent on their representative duties than do 
lead representatives in the private sector (95 per cent, p = 0.009). It appears, therefore, that 
public sector employers are not more likely to provide facility time for lead union 
representatives than private sector employers. 
 
Consultation and partnership working 
The second aim of the paper is to explore the extent to which workplace union 
representatives are engaged in consultation/ partnership working with managers in the public 
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sector, and hence are operating in a manner that is likely to add value within their 
workplaces. As with the analysis of union representative presence, results are presented for 
both the union representative population as a whole and also for full-time representatives 
more specifically. This is important given the government’s specific concern that full-time 
representatives fail to ‘reflect and respond to the wishes and views of the grassroots 
members’ (Department for Communities and Local Government 2013, p. 3). 
The first form of partnership working examined is union representative involvement 
with JCCs. Compliance with the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 
2004 often involves putting arrangements such as JCCs in place to enable managers and 
union representatives to discuss issues of concern and develop ways to address specific issues 
and improve organisational performance. Hence, the paper assesses the extent to which 
workplace union representatives are involved in partnership working of this nature.  
With regard to this, as the first row of table 2 shows, JCCs are more widespread in the 
public sector than in the private sector, being reported in 15 per cent and 6 per cent of 
workplaces respectively (p = 0.000). Unsurprisingly, therefore, public sector workplaces are 
also more likely to have a JCC on which a representative sits (7 per cent of workplaces) than 
are private sector workplaces (1.1 per cent, p = 0.000). These figures might seem somewhat 
low in both sectors. However, JCCs tend to be found in larger workplaces, hence as row 3 of 
table 2 shows, 35.8 per cent of the public sector workforce are employed in a workplace with 
a JCC on which a union representative sits, in comparison with 12.29 per cent of employees 
in private sector workplaces (p = 0.000). Therefore, if one indication of the existence of 
partnership working between union representatives and managers is representative 
involvement on JCCs, the figures here suggest that a sizeable minority of the public sector 
workforce is located in workplaces in which such partnership working occurs. 
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 Table 2: Representative presence on Joint Consultative Committees in the public and private sectors 
 Public sector Private sector p value 
Workplaces with a JCC 15.1 5.7 0.000 
Workplaces with a JCC on which the union 
representative sits 
7.0 1.1 0.000 
Proportion of employees in workplaces with a 
JCC 
35.8% 12.3% 0.000 
Workplaces with union recognition that have a 
JCC 
15.8 16.8 0.757 
Workplaces with union recognition that have a 
JCC on which the representative sits 
7.7 9.0 0.454 
Proportion of workplaces with a JCC and a 
representative where the representative sits on 
the JCC 
71.5 71.4 0.991 
Proportion of workplaces with a JCC and a full-
time rep, and the representative sits on the JCC 
84.6 95.0 0.084 
Base: all workplaces 
 
However, as employee requests under the Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations 2004 are required before employers need to put arrangements in place to inform 
and consult employees, it would be expected that more JCCs will be found in workplaces 
with union recognition, given that union members are particularly likely in such 
circumstances to make requests. Given this, to compare union representative involvement in 
the public and private sectors on JCCs, it is necessary to focus on union recognised 
workplaces alone. With regard to this, the results in row 4 of table 2 show that among 
workplaces with union recognition, the proportion of workplaces that have a JCC is no 
different in the public sector (16 per cent) than in the private sector (17 per cent) (p = 0.757), 
while row 5 of table 2 shows that 8 per cent of public sector workplaces with union 
recognition and 9 per cent of private sector workplaces with union recognition have a JCC on 
which the representative sits (p = 0.454). In workplaces with union recognition, therefore, 
there are no differences in terms of the extent of adoption of JCCs or in terms of the extent of 
involvement of union representatives in those JCCs between the public and private sectors. 
The figures in row six of table 2 extend the analysis of union representative 
involvement on JCCs by exploring whether, in workplaces that have both a JCC and a union 
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representative, the representative sits on the JCC. This might be considered an important 
indicator, given that if union representatives in such workplaces are not able to sit on the 
JCC, this could be indicative of either a lack of management willingness to involve them in 
decision-making processes, or a lack of willingness on the part of the representative to 
engage in this form of partnership working. The figures show, however, that in workplaces 
with a JCC and a representative, the proportion of workplaces in which the representative sits 
on the JCC is high, and is almost identical in the public and private sectors (71.5 per cent and 
71.4 per cent respectively) (p = 0.991). The final row repeats this analysis for full-time 
representatives. In public sector workplaces that have a JCC and a full-time workplace union 
representative in place, the representative sits on the JCC in 85 per cent of public sector 
workplaces and 95 per cent of public sector workplaces (p = 0.084).   
In instances where workplace union representatives are present, therefore, it would 
appear that their involvement on JCCs is commonplace. If this is viewed as an indicator of 
the extent to which union representatives and managers are engaged in partnership working, 
the figures here suggest that the vast majority of representatives are willing to work in this 
manner. Particularly notable, though, is that in workplaces with union recognition, the 
involvement of union representatives in JCCs is no different in the private sector than in the 
public sector. There is no evidence, therefore, that the public sector is exceeding the private 
sector in terms of the provision of facility time for workplace union representatives to engage 
in JCC activity. 
A further indication of the existence of partnership working, as discussed above, is the 
level of trust that exists between managers and union representatives (Dietz, 2004). As table 3 
shows, 86 per cent of management respondents in public sector workplaces in which 
workplace union representatives are present either agree or strongly agree that union 
representatives can be trusted to act with honesty and integrity. Fewer than 4 per cent of 
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managers in such workplaces disagree with this. Notably, management’s trust in union 
representatives is significantly lower (p = 0.018) in the private sector than in the public 
sector, with 70 per cent of private sector managers believing that union representatives can be 
trusted to act with honesty and integrity and 11 per cent believing union representatives 
cannot be trusted. These figures are also notable in light of the higher ratio of reps to 
employees in the public sector than in the private sector reported earlier. The figures here 
suggest that public sector managers do not view this ratio as excessive, given that were they 
to do so, it is unlikely that they would report such high levels of trust in union 
representatives. 
Table 3 also reports separate figures for workplaces with a full-time representative. 
These figures suggest that 84 per cent of management respondents in public sector 
workplaces with full-time representatives present either agree or strongly agree that full-time 
union representatives can be trusted to act with honesty and integrity. This suggests that 
public sector managers do not regard their relationships either with union representatives in 
general, or with full-time union representatives more specifically, as problematic. 
 
Table 3: Managers’ views of whether representatives can be trusted to act with honesty and integrity 
(workplaces in which representatives are present) 
 Public sector Private sector 
 Workplaces with 
union 
representatives 
Workplaces with a 
full-time rep 
Workplaces with 
union 
representatives 
Workplaces with a 
full-time rep 
Strongly agree 33.1 34.6 27.5 32.6 
Agree  53.1 49.3 42.3 53.6 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
10.3 11.5 19.3 10.3 
Disagree 2.7 1.9 8.2 2.8 
Strongly disagree 0.8 2.6 2.8 0.7 
N=944 
Public sector workplaces with union representatives vs. private sector workplaces with union representatives, p 
= 0.018 
Public sector workplaces with full-time union representatives vs. private sector workplaces with full-time union 
representatives, p = 0.674 
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Table 4 explores union representatives’ views of managers. Drawing on data from the 
WERS worker representative survey, the figures show that 70 per cent of lead workplace 
union representatives in the public sector agree or strongly agree that managers can be trusted 
to act with honesty and integrity and only 10 per cent disagree or strongly disagree. 
Reflecting the higher level of trust in union representatives among managers in the public 
sector than in the private sector, lead workplace union representatives in the public sector are 
more positive in their views of management honesty and integrity than are their counterparts 
in the private sector (p = 0.041), the corresponding figures in the private sector being 66 per 
cent of representatives in agreement with this statement and 20 per cent in disagreement.  The 
proportion of full-time lead representatives (defined as spending 37.5 hours or more per week 
on their representative activities)4 in the public sector who agree or strongly agree that 
management can be trusted is lower than the proportion of public sector lead representatives 
overall who agree with this statement, though the figure is nevertheless still almost six in 10. 
There is also no difference (p = 0.649) between full-time public sector and full-time private 
sector lead representatives’ views on whether managers can be trusted to act with honesty and 
integrity. Overall, therefore, the high levels of trust between managers and lead union 
representatives in the public sector might be viewed as indicative of high levels of partnership 
working.  
Table 4: Representatives’ views of whether managers can be trusted to act with honesty and integrity in 
their dealings with worker reps (worker representative survey) 
 
 Public sector 
representatives 
Public sector 
full-time 
representatives 
Private sector 
representatives 
Private sector 
full-time 
representatives 
Strongly agree 20.9 9.7 26.4 0 
Agree  49.2 47.2 39.4 71.8 
Neither agree nor disagree 19.5 21.8 14.0 23.1 
Disagree 5.7 2.9 18.2 5.1 
Strongly disagree 4.7 18.4 2.0 0 
Base: All union representatives in workplaces with union recognition 
N=755 
Public sector representatives vs. private sector representatives, p = 0.041 
Public sector full-time representatives vs. private sector full-time representatives, p=0.649 
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A further indication of the existence of partnership working between managers and 
union representatives is whether union representatives are involved in joint decision-making 
with regard to the workplace. Drawing again on data from the WERS worker representative 
survey, table 5 shows that a large majority of lead union representatives in the public sector 
(66 per cent) either strongly agree or agree that union representatives work closely with 
management when changes are being introduced in their workplace (table 5). The 
corresponding figure for lead representatives in the private sector is 71 per cent (the 
difference is not statistically significant p=0.117). It should also be noted that in the public 
sector, more full-time lead union representatives than non-full time union representatives 
either agree or strongly agree that union representatives work closely with management when 
changes are being introduced in their workplace, with the figure for ‘agree’ plus ‘strongly 
agree’ increasing to 82 per cent among the cohort of full-time lead representatives. This 
figure is also higher (p = 0.000) than the figure of 61 per cent among the cohort of full-time 
private sector lead representatives. Hence there is no evidence that full-time lead 
representatives are unwilling to engage in partnership working with management in the 
public sector. If anything they are more likely to engage in this form of working than are part-
time lead union representatives, thus suggesting that government plans to reduce the number 
of full-time workplace union representatives will do nothing to improve management-union 
co-operation in introducing change in public services. 
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Table 5: At this workplace union representatives work closely with management when changes are being 
introduced (worker representative survey) 
 Public sector 
representatives 
Public sector 
full-time 
representatives 
Private sector Private sector 
full-time 
representatives 
Strongly agree 24.2 22.9 37.9 15.5 
Agree  41.9 58.9 33.4 35.2 
Neither agree nor disagree 10.6 1.2 16.1 40.4 
Disagree 9.4 0.6 7.3 0 
Strongly disagree 13.9 16.5 5.3 8.9 
Base: All union representatives in workplaces with union recognition 
N=756 
Public sector representatives vs. private sector representative, p = 0.117 
Public sector full-time representatives vs. private sector full-time representatives, p=0.000 
 
A final indication of the existence of partnership working is the degree of managerial 
support for the workplace union representative role. Drawing on data from the WERS worker 
representative survey, table 6 explores the extent to which managers provide facilities to 
union representatives to use for their representation duties at the workplace. Overall, lead 
union representatives report having access to most of the facilities asked about. In terms of 
differences between representatives in the public and private sectors, the results suggest that, 
in terms of statistical significance, lead union representatives in the public sector are no more 
or less likely to report having access to a telephone, an office also used for other purposes, 
rooms for meetings, a computer, email or space on the company intranet. Although they are 
more likely (at the 5 per cent significance level) to report having an office specifically for 
representative duties than private sector representatives, they are less likely (at the 5 per cent 
significance level) to report access to a photocopier than are union representatives in the 
private sector. Overall, therefore, the evidence suggests that facilities for workplace union 
representatives in the public sector are similar to those in the private sector, suggesting that 
non-statutory advice from government departments to restrict the facilities for union 
representatives (Department for Communities and Local Government 2013) would reduce 
facilities to below private sector levels.  
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Table 6: Facilities provided to representatives 
 Public sector Private sector 
Telephone 75.9 85.1 
Office specifically for representative duties 34.2 19.7** 
Office also used for other purposes 48.2 54.1 
Rooms for meetings 87.6 77.8 
Photocopier 73.8 86.7** 
Computer 70.5 77.7 
E-mail 68.9 76.8 
Space on the company intranet 39.7 40.4 
None of the above 5.4 3.2 
Base: All union representatives in workplaces with union recognition 
N=758 
** p<0.05 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper explored the presence of workplace union representatives in the British public 
sector and the extent to which they are engaged in partnership working with management, 
thereby contributing to findings from previous consultations on trade union facilities and 
facility time in Britain (DTI, 2007). As discussed above, this analysis might be considered 
particularly timely given the provisions within the Trade Union Bill 2015-16 concerning 
reporting requirements and reserve powers in relation to facility time in the public sector. The 
government’s justification for these provisions stems from concerns that the number of union 
representatives (particularly full-time representatives) is excessive (Cabinet Office 2014; 
Department for Education 2013, 2014), and also that union representatives may have 
deleterious employment relations effects in the workplaces in which they are located 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2013). The analysis presented here 
sheds light on whether these concerns are justified.  
With regard to the presence of trade union representatives, the analysis found that 
public sector workplaces with union recognition are more likely than private sector 
workplaces with union recognition to have a union representative. It also found the ratio of 
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union representatives to be higher in the public sector than the private sector. This does not, 
however, suggest that union representative presence should be viewed as excessive in the 
pubic sector given that 62 per cent of public sector workplaces do not have a union 
representative, and also given that a high proportion of managers in the public sector (86 per 
cent) state that representatives can be trusted to act with honesty and integrity, with their 
views being significantly more positive with regard to this than those of private sector 
managers. It is unlikely that public sector managers would report such positive views on 
union representatives if they considered the number of representatives, or the ratio of 
representatives to employees, to be problematic.  
There is also no evidence that the government’s concerns over the number of full-time 
representatives are justified, given that, within workplaces with union recognition, only 2.8 
per cent of public sector workplaces have a full-time union representative. This is not out of 
line with the figure of 2.2 per cent in private sector workplaces. In addition to this, it is 
notable that the vast majority of public sector managers in workplaces with full-time 
representatives (84 per cent) either agree or strongly agree that union representatives can be 
trusted to act with honesty and integrity. It is doubtful that public sector managers would hold 
such positive views if the full-time union representatives in their workplaces were not using 
facility time appropriately to help address organisational problems, or if, as alleged, they 
were using facility time and facilities to engage in inappropriate political activities 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2013).  
It is also notable that where full-time representatives are present, they tend to be 
located within very large workplaces. As such, it is likely that they are working on a full-time 
basis because they represent a large number of members, hence they will have a wide range 
of employment relations issues to assist management with. Given this, one might argue that 
full-time union representatives provide significant economies of scale. They might also be 
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particularly well placed to help employers deal with a broad range of issues in an efficient 
manner, given that they are likely to have developed considerable levels of expertise as a 
result of the time they spend on representative duties. If the Trade Union Bill 2015-16 
prohibits them from performing their role on a full-time basis, employers will lose access to 
this skill and expertise. 
Overall, therefore, it appears difficult to justify the claim that there are too many 
workplace union representatives (full-time or otherwise) in the public sector on the basis of 
the results from the government-sponsored WERS data presented here. This in turn suggests 
that the provisions to collect detailed information on public sector facility time in the Trade 
Union Bill 2015-16 are unnecessary. If the purpose of collecting such data is to ensure public 
sector organisations adopt private sector levels of facility time and limit the number of full-
time representatives, the analysis presented here suggests that facility time (and facilities) and 
the number of full-time representatives are already similar in the two sectors, and are not 
viewed as inappropriate by managers.  The efforts involved in collecting data on facility time 
to inform ministerial judgement as to the appropriate levels of facility time usage are 
therefore likely to result in significant unnecessary expense. Arguably, greater concern 
should be expressed about the proportion of public sector employees (29 per cent) that do not 
have access to a workplace union representative in their workplace during a period of 
significant pressure on public services, rather than about whether there are too many 
representatives in place. 
The second aim of the paper was to explore workplace union representatives’ 
participation in partnership working. This involved a consideration of: workplace union 
representatives’ involvement on JCCs; perceptions of whether both managers and unions can 
be trusted to act with honesty and integrity; whether representatives working closely with 
management when changes are being introduced; and the facilities provided to help 
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representatives conduct their role. The findings suggest that in public sector workplaces 
where JCCs are in operation and union representatives are present, the union representative 
sits on the JCC in 72 per cent of cases (a figure that rises to 85 per cent where full-time 
representatives are concerned). Facility time that allows workplace union representatives to 
sit on JCCs might be viewed, therefore, as underpinning this important element of partnership 
working, as well as being important in enabling public sector employers to meet their 
obligations under the Information and Consultation of Employee Regulations 2004. 
Further indicating the extent of partnership working between union representatives 
and managers in the public sector, 70 per cent of public sector representatives state that 
managers can be trusted to act with honesty and integrity, with public sector representatives 
being more positive in regard to this matter than are private sector representatives. This is a 
notable finding, particularly when combined with the finding reported above that public 
sector managers are more likely to state that union representatives can be trusted to act with 
honesty and integrity than are private sector managers. It would appear therefore that levels 
of trust between union representatives and managers are higher in the public sector than in 
the private sector. This in turn might be seen as indicative of higher levels of partnership in 
the public sector than the private sector, given that high trust levels are considered to be an 
important feature of partnership working (Dietz 2004). In addition to this, further suggesting 
high levels of partnership working in the public sector, 66 per cent of representatives in the 
public sector state that they work closely with managers when changes are being introduced 
(a figure that rises to 82 per cent for full-time representatives), and they also report being 
well-supported by managers in terms of access to facilities.  
As such, the analysis finds considerable evidence of partnership working in public 
sector between managers and both full and part-time union representatives. Partnership 
working is considered to be highly important in terms of delivering improvements to public 
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services (DTI 1998; Work Foundation 2004). However, if the provisions contained within the 
Trade Union Bill 2015-16 contribute towards a climate in which public sector employers are 
encouraged to reduce facility time, this is likely to undermine this close co-operation between 
union representatives and employers, thereby threatening efforts to deliver improvements to 
public services in the future. 
Overall, the findings suggest that the reporting requirements and reserve powers in 
relation to facility time in the public sector contained in the Trade Union Bill 2015-16 are 
unnecessary, and may have significant deleterious effects on public services. It would not be 
unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that given the many challenges the public sector is likely 
to face in the forthcoming years, the provisions in the Trade Union Bill 2015-16 relating to 
public sector facility time are more likely to hinder rather than help public sector managers in 
their attempts to improve public service provision.   
 
Notes 
1. The presence of full-time representatives is identified in the WERS survey of 
managers via the question: ‘Are there any representatives or stewards of 
recognised unions who in practice spend all, or nearly all, of their working time on 
union affairs concerning this workplace?’ 
 
2. There are 74 workplaces in the survey of managers in which the management 
respondent states a union representative is present but their union is not 
recognised (31 in the public sector and 43 in the private sector). The statutory 
provisions for facility time for union representatives enshrined within the Trade 
Union & Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, only apply to 
representatives of recognised trade unions. Hence, these union representatives’ 
activities and relationships with management are likely to be somewhat different 
from those of their counterparts in workplaces where the union is recognised. 
Therefore, to maintain consistency in the ‘workplaces with union representatives’ 
category, workplaces with union representatives in which the union is not 
recognised for bargaining purposes are allocated to the ‘non-union’ category. 
 
3. Within the worker representative survey, there are 37 union representatives in 
workplaces in which the management respondent states that the union is not 
recognised for bargaining purposes. For the reasons outlined above, these 
representatives are excluded from the analysis. 
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4. Full-time union representatives are defined in the WERS worker representative 
survey as representatives that spend 37.5 hours or more per week on their role. 
However, it is not possible to ascertain within the WERS worker representative 
survey data whether these representatives are working in their regular job in 
addition to these hours or whether they receive paid time off for all of these hours. 
Hence, the results with regard to full-time representatives drawn from the WERS 
worker representative survey need to be treated with caution.   
 
References  
 
ACAS (2003) Information and Consultation at Work: from challenges to good practice. 
Research Paper 03/03. 
 
ACAS (2010) Code of Practice 3 Time off for Trade Union Duties and Activities. Norwich: 
TSO. 
 
ACAS (2014) Employee Communications and Consultation. London: ACAS. 
 
ACAS (2015) Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures. Norwich: TSO.  
 
Bacon, N. and Samuel, P. (2009) ‘Partnership agreement adoption and survival in the British 
private and public sectors’. Work, Employment and Society, 23, 2: 231-248. 
 
Budd, J. W. and Mumford, K. (2004). ‘Trade unions and family-friendly policies in Britain’. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 57 (2): 204–22. 
 
Cabinet Office (2014) Savings from a decline in full-time trade union representatives. Press 
Release 24th July 2014. 
 
Charlwood, A. and Forth, J. (2009) ‘Employee representation’. In W. Brown, A. Bryson, J. 
Forth and K. Whitfield (eds) The Evolution of the Modern Workplace. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 74-96. 
 
Dietz, G. (2004) ‘Partnership and the development of trust in British workplaces’. Human 
Resource Management Journal, 14: 5–24. 
 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2009) Engaging for Success: Enhancing 
Performance Through Employee Engagement. URN 09/175. London. 
 
Department for Communities and Local Government (2013) Taxpayer Funding of Trade 
Unions: delivering sensible savings in local government. London.  
 
Department for Education (2014) Review of Trade Union Facility Time in Schools: results of 
government call for evidence. London. 
 
Department for Education (2014) Advice on Trade Union Facility Time: For school leaders, 
governing bodies, employers and employees in schools. London. 
 
28 
 
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (1998) Fairness at Work, Cm 3968. London: The 
Stationery Office. 
 
DTI (2007) Consultation Document Workplace Representatives: A review of their facilities 
and facility time. URN 06/1793. 
 
Freeman, R.B. and Medoff, J.L. (1984) What do unions do? New York: Basic Books. 
 
Royal Commission on Unions and Employers’ Associations (1968) Report. London: HMSO. 
 
Terry, M. (1995) Trade unions: shop stewards and the workplace. In P. Edwards (ed) Industrial 
Relations: Theory and Practice in Britain. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 203-228. 
 
Work Foundation (2004) Trade union and employee involvement in public service reform. 
London: Office of Public Services Reform. 
 
 
 
